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Formalizing the Future: How Central Banks Set Out  
to Govern Expectations but Ended Up  
(En-)Trapped in Indicators 
Timo Walter ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Formalisierung der Zukunft: Wie Zentralbanken auszogen, Er-
wartungen zu steuern und sich dabei in ihren Indikatoren verfingen«. Modern 
‘inflation targeting’ monetary policy has been one of the prototypes of future-
oriented modes of social coordination which in recent years have captured the 
sociological imagination. Modern central banking is commonly presented as 
achieving greater efficacy by directly managing economic expectations, in par-
ticular when contrasted with the previous heavy-handed, “hydraulic” transmis-
sion of policy objectives through systems of economic aggregates. Such empiri-
cal claims are mirrored in the theoretical distinction drawn by sociologists 
between the openness and efficacy of future-oriented coordination of expecta-
tions, and the more rigid coordination achieved through formal organizing and 
formalization. This paper uses the case of the US Federal Reserve’s (Fed) transi-
tion to inflation targeting in the 1980s to show how the precision and flexibil-
ity of social coordination through expectations in fact relies on extensive for-
malization and rigid proceduralization. I show that the tightly coupled control 
relation on which inflation targeting rests is not possible without the constitu-
tive exclusion of other modes of representing and intervening the economy 
achieved by this formalization. However, the price for the robust and precise 
reactivity that modern central banking has constructed between key indicators 
of inflation expectations and the interest rate set by monetary policy is a com-
prehensive procedural dis-embedding of monetary policy from the structure of 
economic activities whose path into the future it is meant to govern. The paper 
concludes that in order to better understand the conditions under which fu-
ture-oriented modes of coordination fail or succeed, we need to study more 
closely the formalization of social relations on which they are founded. 
Keywords: Central banks, monetary policy, expectations, futurity, economic co-
ordination, indicators, inflation targeting. 
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1. Introduction: The Politics of Expectations and the Rise 
of Modern Inflation Targeting 
Since the 1980s, central banks have proven themselves veritable masters at 
playing the game of the “politics of expectations” (Beckert 2016, 80). The 
“hydraulic”, Keynesian vision of monetary policy (which sought to exploit the 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment by managing aggregate de-
mand) was gradually replaced by a novel regime focused on conducting the 
conduct of market actors, “whose activities propel the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy” (Braun 2015, 369). Based on novel theoretical develop-
ments in macroeconomics such as in particular the Rational Expectations (RE) 
revolution (see Cesarano 1983), central banking today primarily relies on the 
management of expectations (Woodford 2003, 15ff.) for implementing mone-
tary policy. 
According to both practitioners and macroeconomic theory (Morris and Shin 
2008; B. Friedman 2002; Woodford 2003), the (seemingly) remarkable effi-
ciency of this novel regime of inflation targeting (Bernanke and Woodford 
2006) is a result of its greater technical sophistication, compared to the rigidity 
and heavy-handedness of previous hydraulic implementation of monetary poli-
cy. Instead of influencing inflation expectations indirectly through the manipu-
lation of macroeconomic aggregates, modern monetary policy seeks to shape 
directly the structures of expectations of economic actors, which thus deter-
mines the effectiveness of policy. By focusing directly on the more pliable 
expectations mechanism, monetary policy thus can circumvent the disconnect 
between its policy measures and their ultimate target, inflation, that results 
from the lags and frictions when policy signals are transmitted through the 
system of economic aggregates instead. Following the famous “Lucas critique” 
of monetary policy (Lucas 1972, 1996), the key challenge for monetary policy 
thus consists in achieving credibility in terms of the predominant structure of 
(rational) expectations among economic actors: “if [monetary policy] is believ-
able enough to shape (rational) expectations, it will work itself out like a self-
fulfilling prophecy” (Mann 2018).  
Since the rise to prominence of Rational Expectations thinking in the 1980s, 
central banks have set out to “govern the future” (Braun 2015) by deploying 
increasingly sophisticated “instruments of imagination” (Beckert 2016) such as 
forecasts, indicators and various forms of discursive framing as a means for 
shaping the expectations of economic actors. By providing a firm calculative 
framing (Braun 2015, 371) for (rational) expectations, such a future-oriented 
mode of coordination can be argued to achieve a more fine-grained and effi-
cient conduct of conduct in the face of the fundamental openness and uncer-
tainty of the future (cf. Beckert 2016, 51ff.), than the more heavy-handed and 
imprecise hydraulic monetary policy.  
HSR 44 (2019) 2  │  105 
Social-scientific scholarship has predominantly tended to echo the claims 
made by practitioners and macroeconomic theory alike about the (technical) 
benefits of inflation targeting as a mode of monetary policy – although many 
remain critical of its affinities with neoliberalism (e.g., McNamara 2002 ; Fer-
nández-Albertos 2015). The idea of central bank communication shaping ex-
pectations has, however, captured the imagination of social scientists (Holmes 
2014; Smart 2006; Abolafia 2010; Hall 2008). It has played into a widespread 
interest in questions of performativity, futurity, and expectations in particular in 
fields such as economic anthropology and sociology (for a critical overview, 
see Sparsam 2019). As a result, the image of central banks as key players in a 
process of jointly narrating the future (Holmes 2009, 386) has become very 
influential. Existing work on the social underpinnings of monetary policy has 
thus foregrounded how central banks deploy various instruments of imagina-
tion for the purpose of “organizing to produce decidability and actionability” 
(Power 2007, 5). This has yielded a vision of central banks creatively crafting 
“imagined futures” which become “performative to the extent that economic 
actors adjust their practices to fit the narrative” (Beckert 2016, 116) – thus 
allowing central banks to become dominant players in the “politics of expecta-
tions” through which the economy is increasingly governed.  
More recent difficulties faced by inflation targeting, in particular the failure 
to “see” the 2008 financial crisis (Fligstein, Stuart Brundage, and Schultz 
2017), and a return to more hydraulic policy tools under the label of quantita-
tive easing (e.g., Braun 2016) have raised some hard questions about this story-
line. Work on the communicative turn in monetary policy has neglected its 
structural preconditions, most significantly that a “communicative apparatus… 
[must first] disentangle and frame a space within which the formation and 
coordination of monetary expectations becomes possible in the first place” 
(Braun 2015, 372). Such reliance on formalizations and abstractions as a means 
to “enrol” other actors (Callon and Law 1982) in “centers of calculation” 
(Latour 1990) and thus shape their actions at a distance (Rose 1993) can in 
many cases improve actors' ability to observe and control the effectiveness of 
their (policy) interventions (cf. Salais 2012, 57). However, formalization has 
always been a two-edged sword, in that its effectiveness is based on extensive 
processes of bracketing and black-boxing. 
Any “investment in form” (Thévenot 1984) necessarily involves a “render-
ing” (Thévenot 2009, 806) of the (joint) purpose of governing that entails 
trade-offs regarding whose perspectives on and which dimensions of a problem 
are included and represented, and thus made procedurally and operatively 
relevant for a given governmentality (see Rose and Miller 1992). Questions 
about how and “when formality works” (Stinchcombe 2001) have arguably not 
received sufficient attention when it comes to monetary policy – neither among 
economists and practitioners, nor social scientists. This paper therefore seeks to 
“open the black box” (MacKenzie 2005) of the particular type of formality and 
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abstraction that underlies inflation targeting. Its objective is to account for the 
considerable gap that has opened up in recent years between the narrow opera-
tive and technical efficiency of inflation targeting and its wider substantive 
effectiveness and rationality, particularly visible in its comprehensive neglect 
of financial (in-)stability (e.g., Fligstein, Stuart Brundage, and Schultz 2017; 
Golub, Kaya, and Reay 2014). 
I take as a starting point for reflexion the case of the US Federal Reserve’s 
(Fed) transition to inflation targeting, focusing in particular on the constitutive 
role of its ‘Monetarist Experiment’ under chairman Paul Volcker in the early 
1980s. There, I trace the emergence of the specific formalization of monetary 
policy that made possible its remarkable, if narrow, operative and technical 
efficiency in conducting inflation expectations. I show how the formalization 
which makes possible this efficiency constitutively requires the disconnection 
of technical procedures from the activities it seeks to govern, resulting in limi-
tations to its wider structural or social effectiveness typical of formal organiz-
ing (Power 1997; Meyer and Rowan 1977). The ability of inflation targeting to 
conduct expectations depends on a particular mode of futurity that would be 
impossible without comprehensive prior formalization and formal organizing. 
Rather than a simple forward extrapolation or projection which (performative-
ly) coordinates actors and actions, inflation targeting involves a bidirectional 
form of futurity: in order to shape expectations of the future, this future is made 
a constitutive part of the present by making present market operations into 
indicators of the future to come. The future thus delineated on the basis of 
present indicators is constantly fed back into the present, reflexively reshaping 
present operations before the future projected ever materializes (Mallard 2017; 
Mallard and Lakoff 2011). Governing (the future through) expectations in this 
way thus does not directly require (or track) substantive changes in the macroe-
conomic aggregates it seeks to control, and which would correspond to the 
shifts in the structures of expectations it manufactures. As a result, rather than 
coordinating expectations and actions towards a jointly conceived future, this 
produces an operative proceduralization of futurity. This proceduralization 
functions, in important respects, like a standard in that it vastly improves the 
reactivity (Espeland and Sauder 2007) of the actors and expectations linked by 
it, thus allowing for efficient fine-tuning within the frame of abstraction. At the 
same time, much like other forms of standardization, this formalization signifi-
cantly reduces the ability of policy procedures based on it to operatively cap-
ture and deal with the substantive spectrum of the phenomenon or policy prob-
lem it is meant to govern (Thévenot 2009, 806; see also Salais 2012, 57; Diaz-
Bone 2016, 55). 
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2. How Governing Inflation Expectations Depends on 
Formalizing the Future 
Formal organization and the process of organizing as such (Weick, Sutcliffe, 
and Obstfeld 2005) in modern societies are characterized by a constant tension 
between the durability achieved by typification, abstraction, and formalization 
on the one hand, and the various forms of informality in which formality is 
embedded and which it seeks to govern (see Stinchcombe 2001; Kallinikos 
2004). Formality and abstraction are the precondition for the instruments of 
imagination such as formal theories, devices, or forecasts (Beckert 2016, 
217ff.) by which joint social purpose(s) can be represented, imagined, and re-
embedded in situated action (see Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 2000; Stinch-
combe 2001, 18-54). 
In contrast, recent (sociological) scholarship on expectations and futurity as 
a distinct mode of social coordination (e.g., Beckert 2016; Mische 2009) has 
tended to present this as a phenomenon distinct from, in particular, the formali-
zations and abstractions on which research on the calculative foundations of 
economic dynamics has focused (e.g., Callon and Muniesa 2005; MacKenzie 
2006). Given the fundamental uncertainty of the future, so the argument goes, 
the coordination of expectations necessarily relies on an element of imagination 
(cf. Beckert 2016, 51ff.), countervailing the iron cage of formally organized 
social action. 
However, as David Stark has pointed out, uncertainty is not truly a property 
of the future per se, nor does it result from the boundedness of (subjective) 
rationality and the inability to know an unknowable future (Stark 2009, 14). 
Rather, it results from the dissonance between distinct orders of worth which 
prevents the delineation of explicit means-ends relationship by which joint 
social purpose is operationalized. Uncertainty thus means simply an absence of 
the conception and development of technologies of intervening by which the 
ends in terms of which they have become assembled can be realized (on organ-
izing as a combination of “representing and intervening”, see Hacking 1983; 
Kallinikos, Hasselbladh, and Marton 2013; Habermas 1973; Rose and Miller 
1992; Stinchcombe 2001). Successful coordination (of, and through expecta-
tions) thus requires effective formalization(s) in order to create joint frames 
that can link the situations in terms of which actors’ calculations and expecta-
tions are defined (Stark 2009, 14). Uncertainty, then, is a property of situations 
in which agents find themselves, resulting from the indeterminacy of such joint 
situations (ibid.). Formalizations, in turn, “are engines for turning situations 
into calculative problems… [they] can be considered as social technologies to 
transform uncertainty into risk” (Stark 2009, 15).  
If coordination is to be effective across multiple actors and contexts, it can-
not escape the need for abstractions and representations which “function as 
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instruments for the construction of imagined futures” (Beckert 2016, 89). For-
malization, understood as “abstractions that govern” (Stinchcombe 2001, 43), 
makes possible to “organize alignment” (Suchman 2000) and thus improves the 
(technical) efficacy of coordination, while reducing cognitive load (Thévenot 
2001b; Stinchcombe 2001, 18-54). Such effectiveness, however, requires first 
that alignment is achieved between conceptualizations of (the joint) purpose(s) 
of the activities to be governed (“governmentality”), formal ways of represent-
ing this field of activities which allow for identifying and delineating means-
ends relations (“programmes”), and the “technologies” and devices meant to 
conduct the activities in question accordingly (Rose and Miller 1992; Thévenot 
2001a; Stinchcombe 2001, 18-54). Indeed, this is precisely what modern mone-
tary policy seeks to achieve: it “disentangles and frames a space within which 
the formation and coordination of monetary expectations becomes possible in 
the first place” (Braun 2015, 372) in order to better attune macroeconomic 
expectations to its policy interventions and make their meaning “discernable 
from the standpoint of situated subjects” (Holmes 2014, 25).  
To achieve such an effective “pragmatic regime governing the engagement 
with the world” (Thévenot 2001a), it is necessary to make an investment in 
form (Thévenot 1984) which can effectively coordinate the substance of the 
(informal) practices in which its abstractions are embedded and which it is 
meant to govern (Stinchcombe 2001, 18-54). It is precisely in abstracting and 
commensurating different perspectives and situations (‘substance’) through a 
common form that frictions may occur, and foment pathologies of organizing:  
The justifiable engagement with a plurality of orders of worth integrated 
through compromise risks being destroyed by standardization, for the reasons 
this analysis has made clear. The level of worth geared towards the common 
good gets reduced to functional properties, measurable according to the en-
gagement with a plan. Evaluation is restricted to the objective of the plan, ra-
ther than the rendering of a wider characterization of the common good. (Thé-
venot 2009, 806; see also Salais 2012, 57; Diaz-Bone 2016, 55) 
When formalizations and / or formal organization fail to align with the sub-
stance of the (informal) activities to be governed, they can become merely 
ritualistic (Power 1997) performances, and continue as a myth and ceremony 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977) of formal rationality despite their increasing ineffec-
tiveness for the actual purposes of social coordination.  
Existing research on how central banks govern through expectations and fu-
turity, but also the sociological literature on this mode of governing in general, 
has tended to downplay the problem of the adequacy (Stinchcombe 2001, 
21ff.) of the formalization(s) underlying the formation and coordination of 
expectations. Holmes (2014) summarizes the conventional wisdom when he 
suggests that, unlike hydraulic and mechanical central banking, modern mone-
tary policy proves more effective as it better manages to take into account, 
address descriptively and thus more effectively coordinate actors’ expectations. 
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In creating a shared frame through communicative practice which can better 
integrate contextual and situational knowledge, modern central banking gov-
erns through  
agile constructions of linguistic scenarios that are susceptible to continuous 
modification and elaboration… Expectations are alive in this economic scene 
and open to refinement and modification going forward. Unprecedented cir-
cumstances can be addressed descriptively, new ideas and new metaphors can 
be generated, and contestation can be treated as inherent at every level in this 
communicative field. (ibid., 25)  
Even contributions that explicitly concede that processes of framing expecta-
tions necessarily must bracket some facets of (social) reality and thus involve a 
loss of information (e.g., Braun 2015) have tended to give analytical priority to 
what Stinchcombe (2001, 10) calls the communicability dimension of formali-
zation(s), that is the question of how “an abstraction system of formality then 
[is] transmissible and correctly interpretable by the people who do the activity” 
(ibid.).  
While there is nothing per se wrong with this focus, it severely undercuts 
our ability to understand how and why governing the future by imagination and 
expectations (sometimes) fails. As the (vast) literature(s) on the pathologies of 
formal organizations demonstrate, the ability of formalities to circulate and 
command (sometimes ritualistic) obedience from various actors is separate 
from the question of the adequacy of form to substance. This means that  
in describing variations in abstraction systems that make them more or less ef-
fective at a given time, we need to describe what makes them accurate, eco-
nomical, sufficient and of wide scope. (Stinchcombe 2001, 20)  
As future-oriented modes of governing expectations also (sometimes quite 
heavily) rely on various forms of abstractions and formalization as instruments 
of imagination (Beckert 2016, 217-68), this suggests the need for a more cau-
tious evaluation of the form of modern inflation targeting monetary policy than 
so far has been provided both by practitioners and macroeconomics, as well as 
their social-scientific observers.  
In order to understand the sources of the (apparent) effectiveness of inflation 
targeting as well as of its pathologies, we thus need to examine the trade-off 
between its enormous effectiveness in terms of communicability (Stinchcombe 
2001, 30ff.) on the one hand, and its adequacy on the other. Adequacy, suc-
cinctly put, involves  
the accuracy of the abstractions, cognitive economy so the abstractions are 
easy to work with, sufficient to represent all the causes of all the relevant ef-
fects, and wide enough in scope so that it covers most of the situations in the 
ear of life it is supposed to govern. (Stinchcombe 2001, 10)  
There is one dimension in particular that is salient with regard to how inflation 
targeting monetary policy organizes alignment (or fails to do so): namely, the 
problem of adequation (Mann 2018, 12) of formalized representation with the 
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activities to be governed. By adequation, I refer to the fact that a formalization 
“admits reality, but speaks only to those aspects that are articulable via its 
formal language” (ibid.). For an investment in form to provide a durable and 
robust means of governing the social, it is necessary that the ways in which it is 
related to the activities to be conducted by technologies of intervening do not 
conflict with the internal coherence and rules of manipulation of the formaliza-
tion(s) (Mann 2018; Stinchcombe 2001, 57ff.).  
Only if we understand how this is achieved are we also in a position to fully 
appreciate the possible sources of pathologies that result from such formaliza-
tion(s). How does the mode of futurity and expectations management charac-
teristic of modern inflation targeting relate to the field of activities it seeks to 
govern, then? This is the question we will first need to answer.  
3. A Case in Point: How the Fed Constructed Targetable 
Inflation Expectations in the 1980s 
3.1 Formalizing Monetary Policy to Re-Make Inflation as a 
‘Technical’ Problem 
Since the 1980s, central banks around the world, following in many respects 
the experience of the Federal Reserve, have abandoned (Keynesian and Mone-
tarist) hydraulic monetary policy in favor of what later became known as infla-
tion-targeting (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997). This label designates a bundle of 
changes in the operative implementation and conceptual representation of 
monetary policy that have developed concurrently in industrialized economies 
over the 1980s and 1990s. Retrospective accounts, as so often, portray this 
evolution in rather Whiggish terms, as a natural progression towards technical-
ly more sophisticated and effective conceptions and methods of monetary poli-
cy – an image that still reverberates through contemporary accounts of this 
transition. From the perspective developed here, a different question appears 
more salient: if we understand monetary policy as based on particular constitu-
tive formalization(s) in the sense developed above, how (and why) precisely 
did these change? And how did this enable central banks, specifically the Fed, 
to claim to have discovered a more efficacious form of monetary policy? In 
order to answer this question, of course, it is first necessary to develop a diag-
nosis of the challenges and struggles the Fed faced in the run-up to this re-
definition of monetary policy. 
The characterization of pre-1980s monetary policy as “hydraulic” or me-
chanical is closely linked to the transition from static and sequential towards 
dynamic, inter-temporal general equilibrium theorizing driven, in large part, by 
the RE revolution’s transformation of the mathematical formalism of macroe-
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conomics. Hydraulic monetary policy was based on the immensely influential 
IS-LM curve (see Young and Zilberfarb 2000 for the constitutive role of IS-LM 
for macroeconomics before RE), which allowed for a systematic and coherent 
depiction of how the supply of money (and its cost, i.e., the interest rate) would 
affect overall economic activity and thus monetary policy’s target variables 
(such as investment, employment) (see Mann 2018). However, the hydraulic 
influencing of macroeconomic variables through varying the price and supply 
of money depends on the existence of institutional rigidities, or “pockets of 
structure” (MacKenzie 2017, 174), which are not fully attuned to what later 
became called ‘Rational’ Expectations. At least some agents needed to not have 
a full grasp of the systemic, inter-temporal implications of varying the money 
supply so that they would mistake purely monetary impulses for real economic 
signals and change their behavior accordingly (cf. the critique by Lucas 1972). 
Without such pockets of structure whose constitutive structure of expectations 
was incongruent with the “true model” according to economic theory, hydrau-
lic impulses would simply crepitate (or have unintended side-effects). As the 
famous Lucas Critique argued, in the presence of RE such monetary impulses 
would be neutral with regard to real economic activity: economic actors would 
simply and correctly anticipate that they would solely affect the price level and 
produce inflation, and fail to adjust their own behavior so as to produce any 
“real” economic effects. Conversely, given RE, the true model of the economy 
held by economic actors would provide a frame for conducting their expecta-
tions directly.  
Conventional wisdom portrays the dependence on rigidity and thus not-
fully-rational expectations as the reason why hydraulic monetary policy was 
less efficacious than modern monetary policy in controlling inflation. However, 
on closer inspection, there remains considerable ambiguity as to whether it 
really was less effective in influencing inflation, in technical terms (Orphanides 
2002, 2003), once political preferences are taken into account. From the per-
spective developed here, rather than assume a continuous, clearly delineable 
phenomenon of ‘inflation’ that could be controlled more or less effectively in 
technical terms, it is more instructive to ask how the formalization of inflation 
evolved, and how this affects the possibilities for governing it as a technical 
problem.  
Retrospective accounts of the travails of monetary policy leading up to the 
1980s monetarist revolution commonly diagnose a lack of decisiveness in 
combating inflation, stemming from two interrelated and mutually reinforcing 
factors: a lack of political will to firmly lean in against inflationary develop-
ments, aggravated by the heavy-handedness of procedures relying on institu-
tional rigidities for the implementation of anti-inflationary measures. Over the 
course of the 1960s and 1970s, the technical deficiencies that resulted from 
these twinned factors became designated as interest rate smoothing and a re-
sultant base drift. According to its critics, fear of political repercussions pre-
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vented the Fed from moving the interest rate sufficiently strongly and anti-
cyclically (especially in booms) to control inflation, with the resultant lags 
generally reinforcing subsequent cyclical countermovements and allowing the 
monetary base (thought to be directly correlated with inflation) to grow in an 
uncontrolled fashion (Axilrod and Lindsey 1981; Meltzer 1991, 39; 43).   
At the same time, practitioners and (expert) observers at the time also com-
monly discussed this as a predominantly technical problem, namely of getting 
the timing and magnitudes of policy interventions right in order to steer infla-
tion and the business cycle smoothly, effectively and reliably. With Monetarist 
arguments gaining ground which saw the effectiveness of hydraulic stimulation 
of economic activity by ‘cheap money’ as dependent on adaptive expectations 
(see M. Friedman 1968), expert debates in monetary policy came to focus on 
the technical problems of improving the timeliness and reducing the ambiguity 
of its policy interventions – in other words, on improving their communicability 
(see above).  
These concerns led to an intense preoccupation with the adequation of mon-
etary policy with the activities to be governed – that is, with how one could 
achieve a coherent formalization of the target domain (economic activities 
responsible for inflation), allowing for delineating clear-cut operational mecha-
nisms that could robustly be triggered by reliable technologies of implementa-
tion. These debates, which extended over most of the 1970s, became known as 
the so-called Instrument-Target Problem (Bindseil 2004, 29ff.; Poole 1970). In 
a highly technical jargon, the Instrument-Target Problem revolved around the 
endogeneity problems facing monetary policy due to the lags observed between 
operative and target variables, and the resulting instabilities of the functional 
relations between variables. In time, this led to a fundamental questioning of 
the operative ontology of monetary policy, that is, by what causal sequences 
monetary policy was actually (to be) transmitted – and which among the prolif-
erating variables and macroeconomic categories were operative, intermediate, 
or ultimate target variables. 
Whereas the retrospective, Whiggish reading of this episode depicts it as a 
lack of political resolve coupled to ‘faulty’ macroeconomic theory, a focus on 
the evolution of formalization(s) draws attention to the processes by which the 
very phenomenon of inflation became represented in ways that allowed for 
novel technical solutions to be delineated and operationalized. Indeed, the very 
debates surrounding the Instrument-Target Problem are best understood, from 
the perspective adopted here, as an attempt at radical functional simplification, 
“the demarcation of an operational domain within which the complexity of the 
world is reconstructed as a simplified set of tight cause-and-effect coupling” 
(Kallinikos 2014, 9). In this perspective, achieving ‘technical’ efficiency is 
possible only on the basis of a prior process of formalization which allows for 
insulating robust means-ends technical control relations from interference by 
other factors (see Kallinikos 2006, 32ff.).  
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As we saw above, the formalization of social practice requires that technol-
ogies of intervening are aligned with how a social good is represented in un-
ambiguous and standardized terms, so that it becomes possible to coherently 
(and thus rationally) act in its pursuit through robust means-ends-relations as 
delineated by the representation. The Fed’s monetary policy pre-1980s argua-
bly lacked many of the properties that make formalization, and the practices it 
instructs, efficient in a narrow technical sense. Building on Offe’s (2006) ar-
guments on how the “structural problems of the capitalist (welfare) state” over 
the course of the 1960s and 1970s had ushered into a configuration in which 
competing social priorities’ struggle for resources put strains on the state appa-
ratus, Krippner (2011) has shown how the Fed struggled to find a way to extri-
cate itself and the conduct of monetary policy from political contestation.  
While existing accounts of the Great Inflation of the “long 1970s” (from the 
mid-1960s to the early 1980s) identify political pressures as a key catalyst, the 
problem was not simply that monetary policy was directly implicated in the 
political struggles at the time, as Krippner, like many others, argues. Rather, 
monetary policy as a pragmatic regime had integrated competing accounts of 
worth, and conceptions and operationalizations of how inflation could be con-
trolled, into a rather ambiguous and heterogeneous formalization and procedur-
alization of monetary policy. Different theoretical conceptions of the causal 
mechanism(s) driving inflation co-existed uneasily within its operative para-
digm. Most famously, the so-called notion of ‘cost-push inflation’ led the Fed 
into various attempts to target the credit extended to particular economic sec-
tors considered to be driving general inflation, and into attempts to control 
wage dynamics. The real bills doctrine (see Glasner 1992), with its notion that 
productive credit could never be inflationary, long persisted within the Fed, so 
that targeting free reserves (reserves not backing productive credit) was seen as 
a way to combat speculative pressures that could lead to asset and, through it, 
generalized inflation. Such partially incoherent substantive theories of inflation 
and the operative mechanisms they implied uneasily coexisted within the Fed’s 
monetary policy. Its multifaceted conception of inflation also entailed a com-
plex apparatus of technologies such as regulations of interest rates, relative 
(credit) prices, and the allocation of money to different sectors of the economy 
(Konings 2011, 106ff.). Through this, monetary policy became drawn into and 
contested over an entire spectrum of competing accounts of social worth – 
whether to fund schools or missiles, homeownership or poor relief (with a little 
artistic license). 
While this did not necessarily undermine the Fed’s ability to be effective, it 
greatly undermined its technical efficiency: the “dissonance” (Stark 2009) it 
introduced into monetary policy procedures greatly facilitated political contes-
tation as it disrupted the links between particular policy measures and a recog-
nizable purpose into which they would cohere. From the point of view of its 
(mainly Monetarist, at the time) critics as well as today’s inflation targeting 
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regime, all of this constituted at worst a pathological interference in technically 
efficacious inflation control – and at best a confounding of what today are seen 
as distinct and (sometimes) conflicting policy objectives of price stability and 
financial stability. From the point of view defended here, however, it consti-
tutes a different formalization of monetary policy – one that experienced diffi-
culties due to its heterogeneous operationalization of inflation and the ambigui-
ty of its technical implementation. At the same time, it remained in many ways 
more open and thus more adequate to inflation as a multifaceted phenomenon 
that affects many constituencies in different ways (see Carruthers and Babb 
1996), and included a greater diversity of possible causal mechanisms and 
(macro-economic) situations than the regime that followed it.  
However, under the combined influence of political contestation, the diffi-
culties of developing a clear-cut, robust and unambiguous technical procedure 
for combating inflation, and the rise to prominence in expert cycles of an ex-
pectations theory of inflation, the Fed came to focus on the problem of the 
communicability of its policy measures. As a consequence, it ended up devel-
oping a functional simplification that undisputedly excels at making the intend-
ed meaning of policies decipherable for economic actors. However, this new 
formalization also came with drawbacks of its own: its core procedures ended 
up bracketing many of the causal interactions and sequences among present-
time aggregate variables by which pre-1980s monetary policy had traced the 
transmission and effectiveness of its policy measures. Instead, the effectiveness 
of monetary policy afterwards came to be defined in terms of an implementa-
tion mechanism that is based on the reactivity of abstract (and indirect) indica-
tors of expectations about the future to one particular operative policy variable, 
the short-term interest rate.  
3.2 Proceduralizing and Encasing Monetary Policy – How the Fed 
Created the Operative Bases for “Governing the Future” 
The contours of the re-formalization and functional simplification of monetary 
policy that ushered into inflation targeting are so naturalized today that they 
have become an unquestioned measure of the technical sophistication and 
efficacy of past monetary policy as well. Contemporary (post-1990s) thinking 
on monetary policy has taken the habit of treating questions of its implementa-
tion as purely technical problems that can be discussed, refined and improved 
upon quite separately from the issue of how the policy impulses sent are trans-
mitted through their target domain, the (macro-)economy. Bindseil, in his high-
ly influential treatise of monetary policy implementation argues that questions 
of what he calls monetary policy strategy (i.e., how the manipulation of its 
operative target, the (short-term) interest rate affects the context of macroeco-
nomic variables) are entirely irrelevant to its operative implementation 
(Bindseil 2004, 3). In line with the postulates of RE thinking about monetary 
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policy (to which we will return shortly below), he goes so far as to suggest that 
it is precisely the lack of this distinction which prevented “Old” (pre-1990s) 
monetary policy from reaching the (allegedly) greater technical sophistication 
and efficacy of its “New” successor (Bindseil 2004, 234-54).  
Instead of taking the undisputedly greater technical coherence and sophisti-
cation (especially on the side of implementation) of contemporary monetary 
policy as the cause for the Great Moderation (Bernanke 2004) of inflation rates 
since the late 1980s, let us ask what investment(s) in form made this possible in 
the first place. What is it that monetary policy is doing so much more effica-
ciously due to its re-formalization since the 1980s – and what had to be exclud-
ed and bracketed from its operative procedures to achieve this greater degree of 
technical mastery? Separating strategy and transmission from the procedures of 
implementation precisely cuts off the question I want to ask: namely, what 
changes in the formalization of monetary policy made possible this seemingly 
efficacious and robust alignment between its formal representation (“strategy”) 
and the operative technologies of implementation? And how is this alignment 
instrumental for stabilizing a target domain in terms of which the impact of 
manipulating certain variables becomes procedurally measurable and observa-
ble?  
As we have seen, the alignment and adequation of the formal (symbolic or 
technological) representation of a target domain with the ways in which the 
relations thus abstracted and represented are made manipulable by technologies 
ultimately determines monetary policy’s (technical) efficiency and effective-
ness. Efficacy thus depends on the continued existence of the alignment of 
technologies and formalizations that constitutes this calculative space. What is 
more, the very criteria for and observability of what efficacy means are bound 
up inextricably with the calculative space set up by the alignment in the first 
place.  
Over the course of the 20th century, monetary policy, like many other social 
fields (Desrosières 2013), has been undergoing a process of social objectivation 
as a result of the increasing formalization of economics and its quantificatory 
strategies (e.g., Backhouse 1995; Mirowski 1989, 2002; Hoover 2001). The 
Neo-Classical Synthesis (Blanchard 2008) of Keynes’s ideas with (static) gen-
eral equilibrium theory had produced a resolutely systemic way of thinking 
about inflation and monetary policy. In particular the “workhorse” IS-LM 
model (Hicks 1937; see also Darity and Young 1995) had gone a long way in 
narrowing conceptions of inflation to the concept of the general price level 
within a formal general equilibrium vision of the economy. In doing so, it had 
laid the foundation for its later Monetarist reformulation which made the gen-
eral price level, and thus inflation, a (synchronous) function of present expecta-
tions about the (fictive) future rather than of the sequential dynamics amongst 
(present) macroeconomic variables unfolding (diachronically) into an actual 
future (see M. Friedman 1968; see also Dimand 2007). By operationalizing 
HSR 44 (2019) 2  │  116 
futurity in terms of indicators formed by present-time feedback loops to shift-
ing visions of the future, central banks thus make a “constitutive use” (Mallard 
2017) of the future in the present. Before we can fully unfold the problematic 
implications of this mode of futurity, however, it is necessary to throw some 
light on the mechanical changes inside the black box of monetary policy that 
occurred in this period. 
In re-framing inflation as a function of expectations, Monetarism provided 
the conceptual foundations for the theoretical and operative separation of im-
plementation and transmission characteristic of modern monetary policy. Be-
fore RE macroeconomics, transmission was conceived of as occurring sequen-
tially between aggregate macroeconomic variables related formally through the 
static, (theoretically) simultaneous equations of the IS-LM world. Afterwards, 
it began to be conceived of (theoretically and operatively) as passing through a 
signaling game influencing expectations rather than “real” macroeconomic 
aggregate variables (directly). Instead of having to worry about the adequacy of 
this formalization in terms of its scope (full spectrum of different actors’ situa-
tive calculations related to inflation) and sufficiency (in capturing all relevant 
mechanisms affecting inflation), RE economics provided the justification for 
focusing mainly on its cognitive economy and communicability (see Stinch-
combe 2001, 18-54). To understand why this functional simplification worked 
in practice, we need to have a closer look at how monetary policy managed to 
abstract and disentangle itself operatively from the multiple accounts of worth 
which it had still incorporated well into the 1970s.  
There is no doubt that numerous political and tactical consideration influ-
enced the Fed’s maneuvering in particular over the early 1980s, as is 
Krippner’s (2011, 106-37) argument. However, the overriding operative and 
technical concerns were with the persistent problems of the lags arising before 
manipulations of instrument variables took their effects on target and ultimate 
policy variables (see above). As a result, the Fed sought to devise a system of 
policy implementation which could convey its policy stance more precisely and 
directly to markets than the often confusing signals that resulted from the lags 
arising from the complex system of relations between the macroeconomic 
aggregates manipulated by monetary policy. The terminology as well as de-
bates surrounding this new system remained ambiguous for several years after: 
initially, the new system was marketed as a more efficient way of shaping the 
path of the money supply (not least to counter the public influence of Monetar-
ist thinking in those years, but also within the Fed’s own ranks). To this end, 
the Fed would estimate required reserves (base money supply), provide part of 
it directly through open-market operations, and let markets borrow the shortfall 
at the discount window at a higher cost. In this way, the Fed avoided the need 
to know expected money supply beforehand in order to match it by its actual 
supply of reserves. It also managed to avoid the disruptions that could result 
from a mismatch, due to the heterogeneity of expectations caused by the lagged 
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interactions between market actors and the Fed. Instead, it would receive real-
time feedback on this mismatch, depending on how much markets borrowed at 
the discount window over and above the initial provision of reserves. This 
allowed for a swift adjustment of the policy signal, while the market in turn 
would receive feedback about the Fed’s evaluation of its own calculations. 
Often interpreted simply as a form of neoliberal market-based governance, this 
mechanism allowed for representing market expectations – it allowed the mar-
ket to “show through” rather than overwrite the price-indicator for market 
expectations with a price driven mainly by the Fed’s actions themselves 
(Krippner, 2011, 121ff.). This system thus presaged the framework and distinc-
tive concern for fine-tuning control over the (short-term) interest rate character-
istic of inflation-targeting.  
In theory, markets would learn to interpret easing and hardening of the poli-
cy stance in numerical terms (today, we are all familiar with central bank’s 
adjustment of policy rates in terms of basis points, i.e., usually quarters of one 
percent) and translate it into a steady rate for guiding their own credit-money 
expansion over time. However, the operative framework remained tied to the 
money supply as the ultimate target variable – which constituted its key weak-
ness as the relation between the interest rate and the money supply suffered the 
same problem of lags and resultant volatilities as other control relations had 
before. In practice, markets at first failed to read Fed policy effectively 
(Cukierman and Meltzer 1986, 69; Feinman and Poole 1989), resulting in pre-
cisely the types of overshoots and credit crunches the Fed had sought to avoid 
by this mechanism (Meltzer 1991, 40; Rosenblum and Strongin 1983). On the 
positive side, though, the credit crunches and extremely high interest rates that 
resulted from this served the Fed as credibility tests, which established its cre-
dentials as being tough on inflation (Goodfriend 2007, 51). 
What is crucial about this new system from the perspective developed here 
is less the operational detail per se, nor the fact that (as any framing) it disen-
tangles calculative processes and thereby necessarily involves a loss of infor-
mation (see Braun 2015). Rather, the key issue is how this novel operative 
procedure disentangles monetary policy implementation: by tying (the control 
of) inflation directly to expectations and their manipulation, rather than indi-
rectly through the manipulation of various macroeconomic aggregate variables. 
While both practitioners and macro-economists still speak about (and reflect 
on) monetary policy in the idiom of (much the same) macroeconomic catego-
ries, operatively these categories have ceased to form a constitutive part of the 
transmission mechanism1, which now passes (exclusively) through the func-
                                                             
1  The recent revival of “unconventional” monetary policy (see Bowdler and Radia 2012), fully 
in line with Rational Expectations Economics, views these as a temporary necessity for re-
storing the transparency of the General Equilibrium after an (unusually large) “exogenous 
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tional relation between the short-term interest rate and market expectations, and 
the signaling game made possible by it.  
The problem of transmission thus becomes one of credibility, whose rise to 
prominence as one of the most widely debated concepts and issues regarding 
monetary policy is anything but accidental. In a RE world, transmission de-
pends not on sequential causal transmission channels, but rather on credibility 
in terms of the structures of expectations of the (much-maligned) “representa-
tive agent” (Kirman 1992). A credible policy signal will, “if it is believable 
enough to shape (rational) expectations… work itself out like a self-fulfilling 
prophecy” (Mann 2018, 18), and trigger the shifts in macroeconomic variables 
concordant with the intended policy outcome(s). Redefining the control of 
inflation as an issue of credibility thus turned policy implementation into an 
issue of the communicability of the policy stance, whose technical efficiency 
manifested itself in how smoothly it could influence expectations about infla-
tion. Additionally, credibility was also linked to the widely debated problem of 
time inconsistency (the possibility to take decisions that benefit some group but 
leave everyone worse off because there are means to postpone those costs in 
the future) endemic to monetary policy. Controlling inflation could thus be 
understood as a one-dimensional communication problem, namely of signaling 
a stable inter-temporal commitment to low inflation (quite unlike the multi-
dimensional conception of inflation that had prevailed before). 
As the Fed quickly discovered, establishing a (direct) functional relationship 
between the short-term interest rate and inflation through the “black box” 
(MacKenzie 2005) of expectations achieved a number of extremely useful 
things. For one thing, it cut out the middlemen of (lagged) variables; like any 
effective technologization, it created a stringent functional simplification that 
significantly reduced interferences in the operative control relation. In addition, 
it vastly reduced the potential for policy contestation, as it allowed the Fed to 
claim that “the market” was actually responsible for economic outcomes, while 
itself it was only setting the short-term rate and not (actively) influencing eco-
nomic activity (Krippner 2011, 116ff.). And finally, in disentangling this novel 
control relation, the Fed effectively installed a device through which it could 
pursue greater technical refinement and efficacy, while bracketing the larger 
question of the substantive effectiveness of its procedures in terms of a wider 
conception of inflation as an entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous eco-
nomic processes. Economic theory provided the necessary justification for this 
narrowing of focus on implementation, by suggesting transmission was secured 
by the existence of RE.  
However, the formalization and proceduralization achieved by the Fed’s 
early Monetarist Experiment initially had some downsides. As long as it for-
                                                                                                                                
shock”, and thus as not requiring a rethinking of the normal problems of monetary policy 
implementation.  
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mally remained tied to a Monetarist rationale or programme aimed at better 
control of the money supply, the high reactivity it achieved produced highly 
volatile responses to the Fed’s policy interventions, inducing severe recessions 
and credit crunches. However, this disadvantage turned out to be a blessing in 
disguise: the recessions induced not only helped structurally break inflation, 
but they pushed the Fed to further reformalize and simplify its novel procedur-
alization in a way that made the degree of reactivity the main measure and 
standard of its effectiveness. Reactivity of expectations thus came to be seen as 
evidence of a central banks’ ability to control inflation expectations, and thus to 
govern (through) the future. But, how much “future” is there in modern infla-
tion targeting really? In order to understand why a governance mechanism that 
was meant to improve control over future outcomes paradoxically has ended up 
quite thoroughly decoupled from the future it allegedly operatively shapes and 
controls, a little conceptual discussion is necessary first.  
In a banal sense, every action and expectation is future-oriented (Tavory and 
Eliasoph 2013). However, the futurity of inflation targeting’s operative func-
tioning is, in fact, achieved by a purely procedural form of social objectivation 
(Salais 2016, 121ff.). Proceduralization is a type of formalization in that it 
disentangles a (calculative) space within which, “as long as the procedure is 
followed, the result obtained belongs to a sphere that is neither that which is 
true or just, but the unfalsifiable” (ibid., 121). That is to say, proceduralization 
inscribes, encases and disentangles values, rationalities and means (and ends), 
so that intervention can proceed free from interfering factors. Proceduralization 
thus also is a form of commensuration, as “commensuration as a mechanism of 
sense making is notable for how rigorously it simplifies information and for 
how thoroughly it decontextualizes knowledge” (Espeland and Sauder 2007, 
17). As commensuration, it “simplifies in two ways: by making irrelevant vast 
amounts of information, and by imposing on what remains the same form – a 
shared metric” (Espeland and Sauder 2007, 17).  
Making the functional relation between short-term interest rate and inflation 
(expectations) the operative core of inflation targeting creates a sort of proce-
dural metric or standard for the effectiveness of monetary policy. The interac-
tion between central banks and markets becomes “legible” (Scott 1998) to both 
in terms, essentially, of a covariation / relation between two (numerical) varia-
bles – that is, effectively, a standard (cf. Brunsson, Rasche, and Seidl 2012). 
Standards, in addition to their semantic poverty, have the additional property of 
enabling and encouraging a relation of reactivity (Espeland and Sauder 2007). 
One’s own actions’ efficiency becomes measured in terms of (re-)actions by 
others (hence measured by a common standard). Successful coordination in 
terms of the standard or disentangled frame thus can become radically decou-
pled from actual, successful interventions in the wider context which the stand-
ard allegedly measures, if and when the standard becomes the main or only 
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criterion of success (Espeland and Sauder 2007; Tavory and Eliasoph 2013, 
925).  
In the early 1980s, the proceduralization initiated by Volcker’s Monetarist 
Experiment was still part of a larger formalization which evaluated its opera-
tive effectiveness in terms of whether it transmitted into desired interaction 
patterns between certain (macroeconomic) aggregate variables. This means that 
proceduralization was, in a sense, incomplete, and much more open to interfer-
ences by the wider economic environment and its institutional rigidities. How-
ever, over the course of the decade, the Fed and other central banks vastly 
“improved” the formalization of their monetary policy, in the sense of closing 
it off to such interference. There is in particular one calculative device and 
instrument that proved instrumental to this process of standardization, and best 
illustrates the stakes involved in this process: namely, the so-called term struc-
ture of the interest rate (see Goodfriend 1998).  
The credibility of monetary policy, and with it the effectiveness of inflation 
targeting thought to depend on it, can hardly be observed directly. Therefore, 
modern monetary policy requires a proxy for making the effects of its policy 
interventions better visible (Mann 2018, 12). Instead of a complex mess of 
unreliable and shifting intermediate variables, the push toward targeting expec-
tations directly thus promised a straightforward control relation between only 
two variables: the short-term interest rate, and inflation expectations. The only 
problem was how to disentangle them from the messy context of market opera-
tions and transactions – both conceptually and operatively (Goodhart 1989, 
314). Instead of measuring this effectiveness in terms of how a policy interven-
tion is transmitted through a texture of economic aggregate indicators (with the 
interferences this can produce), the Fed and other central banks came to rely on 
the term structure of the interest rate (expressing the relationship between the 
interest rates or yields for the same asset at different maturities) as a calculative 
device which could be interpreted as making expectations legible more direct-
ly. While not the only indicator used, it is commonly the central one and typical 
for how monetary policy decisions are arrived at procedurally (Blinder 2004, 
67).  
The term structure had been used as a prism for reading the market within 
the Fed since at least since the 1920s. However, before the shifts I discuss in 
this article, this technique was used to gauge whether the Fed’s measures were 
distorting orderly conditions in the system of financial asset prices. Rather than 
as a tool for capturing the (structure of) systemic expectations of inflation, it 
was used up to the 1980s as an instrument for sterilizing monetary policy inter-
ventions, tightly connected to the Fed’s concern at the time to avoid the pres-
ence of ‘excess’, hence speculative surpluses of ‘idle’ reserves within the fi-
nancial system (see Mehrling 2011, 47ff.).  
Yield curves such as the term structure of the interest rate (typically, on 
government bonds such as Treasuries) thus can be used to “make legible” 
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(Scott 1998) market expectations regarding future interest rates (and thus mon-
etary policy stances) as well as the inflation rates expected for various future 
points in time. The relation between yields at different points in time, and the 
overall shape of the curve, can thus be “read” as a summary of market expecta-
tions relevant for monetary policy (Christophers 2017), but also investment 
decisions (Zaloom 2009):  
Central banks typically estimate both nominal and real yield curves for gov-
ernment debt instruments, and are able to extract from the combination and 
comparison of these what is referred to as the ‘inflation term structure’ or ‘im-
plied inflation curve’ – in other words, the rates of inflation expected by the 
market at different points in time. (Christophers 2017, 66) 
One can therefore, “look first to the interest rate itself as a clue to underlying 
conditions… allowing the interest rate to speak not only about the contempo-
rary financial order but also about the impact that current events may have on 
future economic conditions” (Zaloom 2009, 253). As the Fed always sets the 
short-end of the yield curve directly through its policy actions, the form of the 
curve can be read as an indicator of market expectations as to future policy 
measures (Christophers 2017, 65). The form of the curve can thus serve as an 
indicator of the credibility of monetary policy, as well as indicating the reactiv-
ity of markets to policy actions and thus their effectiveness.  
As markets increasingly have come to use the yield curve as an indicator of 
central banks’ policy stance (Christophers 2017, 66), this calculative device has 
become the focal point through which expectations about the future state of the 
economy and inflation are formed, coordinated and negotiated. This has even 
led some (Christophers 2017, 68) to conclude that “monetary policy fashions 
the economy through the yield curve; the economy reacts back on monetary 
policy through the yield curve”. However, this game of mirrors does not in-
volve “the economy”: it only provides a disentangled metric or standard which 
greatly facilitates the reactivity between market and monetary policy imple-
mentation, thus giving the impression that central banks have vastly improved 
their ability to influence inflation as an overall, substantive economic phenom-
enon. Operatively, the wider economy has been entirely evacuated from this 
procedure, as it is not represented in the form of any indicators within the oper-
ative procedure itself; “the economy” only enters into monetary policy exter-
nally in the form of stories about the form of the yield curve, which itself is 
where actual coordination takes place (see Morgan 2012, 225ff. for an account 
of how narratives and stories remain subordinate to the internal formalism of 
formal economic theories and devices). As Zaloom (2009, 253) points out,  
the interest rate as a number disconnected from a specific time and place pro-
vided a powerful argument… to look first to the interest rate itself as a clue to 
underlying conditions. The number could be interpreted without initial refer-
ence to the specifics of time and place.  
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In terms of the operative core procedures of inflation targeting, central banks 
do not govern the future. The term structure of the interest rate is not quite “an 
object for interpreting the contours of a possible future” (Zaloom 2009, 255) 
that would be independent of the interaction between central banks and mar-
kets, and for coordinating their actions accordingly. Instead, modern monetary 
policy uses “techniques of prospection with a constitutive purpose” (Mallard 
and Lakoff 2011, 341): while nominally regarding a future that is external to 
one’s own actions, and knowledge of which will allow one to adjust one’s own 
course of action, in fact it serves as standard or metric which allows for the 
procedural simulation of policy effectiveness through the loop of reactivity it 
enables.  
This decoupling creates a number of problems. Most problematically, the 
mutual (self-) observation of central banks and financial markets in terms of 
this narrow prism reinforces decoupling. As Alan Blinder (2004, 67ff.) has 
warned, central banks have begun “following the market”, basing their deci-
sions entirely on the reactive relationship between the two operational indica-
tors, made legible in the term structure – and decoupling them from broader 
economic indicators that could represent the (rigid) actual structures of the 
economy. Through this, a joint game develops in which the Fed gains credibil-
ity and thus improves its ability to fine-tune market responses to its interven-
tions – and conversely, so do the markets. However, both players’ access to this 
context-reality is produced entirely by their respective reactions to one another, 
and the forms of legibility they develop in their interaction: in practice, the 
effectiveness of the procedure consists in the fact that central banks and market 
actors have so internalized the pressures of reactivity that they orient their 
estimates of “future” values of indicators to one another’s (Braun 2015, 379). 
Essentially, the term structure becomes an (arbitrary) symbolic system permit-
ting permutations of a form that can be linked to outside states of the world by 
narrativizing the permutations in terms of this world (as Holmes 2014; Smart 
2006 have analyzed it). Importantly, however, this link is entirely at the level of 
narrativization (see Morgan 2001 for a general account of narrating models) – 
as variation in the code system comes exclusively from within the decoupled 
frame and not from the transmission context it supposedly refers to. As a result, 
market actors come to all but ignore actual inflation rates in their decoding of 
central banks’ policies, focusing primarily on interest rates (Braun 2015, 379) 
as the variable which directly affects their operating costs. The “world in the 
model” (Morgan 2012) thus replaces indicators that trace transmission through 
(present-time) context with a future-oriented but self-referential indicator. This 
effectively encapsulates monetary policy implementation in a calculative space 
that is decoupled from that which it seeks to govern, namely the economy and 
its trajectory. 
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4. Conclusion: Crying Wolf or the Dangers of Black 
Boxing... 
In this paper, I have aimed to strike a cautionary note regarding the recent 
focus, in particular in economic sociology, on futurity and expectations as a 
distinct mode of economic (and social) coordination (e.g., Beckert 2016; 
Mische 2009). Monetary policy, with its claims to be governing (through) 
expectations and to be coordinating economic actors by the communicative 
construction of joint futures (Guthrie and Wright 2000; Geraats 2002), provides 
an instructive case for understanding the limitations of this mode of coordina-
tion. “Imagining futures” (Beckert 2016, 48ff.) thus requires formalizations and 
formal ways of organizing whose degree of embeddedness in the substance of 
social practices and structure can vary widely. As I have aimed to show, the 
formation of expectations may well be, especially at the surface, “shaped by the 
ability of humans ‘to see and do things in a novel way’” (Beckert 2016, 48f.). 
However, “expectations in the economy are... anchored in prevailing cognitive 
models, which function as instruments for the construction of imagined fu-
tures” (ibid., 89).  
As a result, even research that is explicitly aware of how the formation of 
expectations remains tied to formal devices and theories (and the loss of infor-
mation that this entails), runs the risk of focusing too much on the dimensions 
of what I have called, following Stinchcombe (2001), the communicability 
gains made possible by specific formalizations, neglecting the question of their 
adequacy. Futurity and expectations as a mode of coordination depend on pre-
viously established typifications and categorizations (Mische 2009, 696; Beck-
ert 2016, 51), and thus on “investment in form” (Thévenot 1984) just as much 
as other modern forms of social organization. The danger here consists in over-
looking the extensive formatting and functional simplification through formali-
zation that is necessary for governing (through) expectations to be possible and 
effective.  
The case of central banking casts considerable doubt on assertions that fu-
turity and expectation management as mode(s) of coordination are (necessarily) 
superior to more formal modes of organizing by allowing more flexible, discur-
sive and reflexive consideration of the contours of a fundamentally uncertain 
future (see, e.g., Mische 2009, 697; Beckert 2016, 51ff.). As I have shown, 
modern monetary policy’s management of expectations depends heavily on 
extensive processes of standardization, commensuration and quantification that 
provide the durable frames within which expectations can coordinate – but at 
the cost of undermining the openness to revision of its underlying categoriza-
tions, measurements and equivalences (see Thévenot 2009, 806 for an argu-
ment as to why closure and standardization go hand in hand). 
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It may thus well be true that “central banks and forecasting institutes 
achieve the co-presence of various evaluative schemes through intensive dis-
cursive exchanges within the epistemic community and ‘the economy’” (Beck-
ert 2016, 260; see also Holmes 2009, 392). But, as I have shown, the (apparent) 
communicative openness of modern monetary policy is made possible precise-
ly by the functional simplification of its operative core to formal procedures 
which are closed off to the very semantic richness and openness that the com-
municative surface practices of central banks make reference to (see Holmes 
2014).  
The more cautious tales told by (former) practitioners that have escaped eve-
ryday operative constraints provide some guidance as to the dangers of over-
looking the modes of formalization that underlie the more communicative 
dynamics of governing by expectations and futurity. As Holmes is forced to 
admit, among both practitioners and economists, “there is no consensus on why 
the framework is successful, why and how expectations become anchored by 
virtue of these targeting protocols” (Holmes 2009, 403). Even in purely tech-
nical terms, the term structure of the interest rate is, as a device for empirically 
predicting future interest rates, an “abject failure” in the words of former Fed 
governor Alan Blinder (Blinder 2004, 74ff.). 
None of this is particularly surprising if we bear in mind that the formaliza-
tion and proceduralization of the domain in question (Thévenot 1984; Kallini-
kos 2004; Habermas 1969) are a precondition for being able to commensurate 
multiple (and heterogeneous) expectations and thus arrive at a definite and 
efficacious course of action (or policy implementation) for pursuing a “com-
mon good”. Formalization and proceduralization are, however, if not the natu-
ral enemy, so at least a natural source of pathologies for any mode of coordina-
tion and governing. In particular, the standardization and formality involved 
make it difficult for “an abstraction system... to have a trajectory of improve-
ment so that it can track changes in the world, increase its scope, and correct its 
errors” (Stinchcombe 2001, 10). Proceduralization of monetary policy has 
created an intertemporal standard by which reactivity can be organized.  
As long as monetary policy functions within this standard and the frame it 
establishes, its adequacy and effectiveness seemingly are constantly reaffirmed. 
However, as the 2008-09 financial crisis has demonstrated, this formalization 
has radically curtailed what the Fed can “see” – or, more precisely, what it can 
operatively and procedurally process and tackle. From the perspective devel-
oped here, it is thus not so much “culture, cognition, and framing” (Fligstein, 
Stuart Brundage, and Schultz 2017) that account for the Fed’s failure to notice 
the financial fragilities that led to the crisis – but rather the semantic decou-
pling of its operative procedures from the formal representations of the eco-
nomic system which, of course, it continued to produce and debate. 
The “interactive nature of the ‘signaling process’ between the central bank 
and those economic actors whose activities propel the transmission” (Braun 
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2015, 369) thus appears to be part of the problem rather than a solution to it: 
rather than improve the adequacy of governing through expectations to the 
“situations” in which agents operated (Stark 2009, 14ff.), the closure through 
formalization that made this signaling process possible meant that monetary 
policy became operatively less responsive or accountable to situated knowl-
edges, mimicking rather than achieving adequacy to the substance of the eco-
nomic processes to be governed. Proceduralization, in this as in other cases, 
entails that the immediate reactivity and appropriateness to the other’s reaction 
overrides the longer-term, “projective” significance of what is being done (see 
Tavory and Eliasoph 2013, 924). 
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